As the election of Trump and the rise of Bernie Sanders attests, Americans are living in populist times. But, what does ‘populism’ mean, and does it deserve its negative reputation? What are the sources of anger that Trump and Sanders tap into as populist candidates? Today, I delve into those questions and explore what the answers may mean for the 2020 U.S. elections.
What is Populism?
Political scientists take different approaches when defining populism. However, several key themes emerge from the academic literature. Researchers seem to agree that populism is not a worldview or ideology but a specific relationship of ideas that are expressed differently depending on historical contexts. Ideas that feature strongly in modern populist discourse includes 1) judging that moral virtue and power ought to be with ordinary people and not elites; 2) opposition to the establishment (perceived power holders like intellectuals and journalists); 3) the need for a charismatic leader who represents the voice of the people; 4) opposition to globalization; 5) identity politics (which includes nativism) and scapegoating; 5) tabloid style rhetoric using slang, swearing, political incorrectness, and being overly demonstrative and colorful; 6) positing the existence of a crisis, breakdown, or threat that demands action decisively and immediately; 7) stressing majoritarianism over protection of minority rights; and 8) appealing to emotions such as anger, indignation, and resentment.1 In sum, populists entertain the narrative of a homogeneous “us” (the forgotten, left-behind common man) that has been betrayed by “them,” the elites and foreigners.
Left-wing vs. Right-Wing Populism
Bernie Sanders and Donald Trump represent the two modes in which populism expresses itself—left-wing and right-wing. Typically, left-wing populists rail against Wall Street and financial interests. They tend to hold positions that are anti-capitalistic, anti-globalist, anti-militaristic, and pro-social justice. Left-wing populists define “us” as the working class and demonize the wealthy as “the other.” Given everything we know about Bernie Sanders, he fits well into the left-wing populist camp. On the other side of the spectrum, right-wing populists are nativists and anti-immigrant (ethno-nationalistic). By making it a habit of scapegoating immigrants, followers of Islam, and marginalized groups like the LGBTQ community—all the while voicing a sense of injured national pride—Trump is following a long tradition taken by other right-wing populists. In the American context, Trump’s rhetoric echoes that of the mid-nineteenth century nativist Know Nothing party.
Why the Resentment?
Given the unmistakable evidence of seething anger and discontent, the big question everyone who cares about such things is asking is why? What underlying forces drive the success of populist candidates like Trump and Sanders? Trump’s presidential victory came as a surprise to just about everyone, and Sander’s rhetoric has been consistent for decades. Yet, today he is electrifying crowds and a leading contender in the Democratic presidential primary. Explanations that researchers offer fall into two categories—economic and cultural.
Economic Dislocation
Those who argue from a financial perspective say that much of the working and middle classes feel abandoned by forces unleashed by neoliberal globalization.2 Since the 1990s, both major American parties embraced the free market and free trade. It was a “third way” Democrat, Bill Clinton, after all, who signed the landmark NAFTA free trade deal. Globalization devasted the working class who once enjoyed a comfortable lifestyle working good union jobs in manufacturing. Many also resent the undemocratic limits imposed by supranational institutions like the World Trade Organization (WTO), World Bank, and the United Nations on state interventions and policies. As the center-left and the center-right adopted neoliberalism, the majority of Americans who tend to be more protectionist were left without a voice.
Enacting tenets of neoliberalism, including deregulation, privatization, and unfettered markets, led to the dominance of the financial sector, which had dire consequences on the productive economy and fed the exponential increase in inequality. It is not just the working class who feel the effects of modernization on society, as college students face heavy student loan burdens, and every American feels the pinch of high medical costs. With essentially stagnant wages and rising costs of living, according to the Conservative think tank, the Manhattan Institute, the median American worker has to earn more than a year’s salary to afford the annual expenses of a family of four. Middle-class Americans are behind on homeownership, retirement savings, and carry substantial debt. The latest statistics show that 1 in 6 of American children grow up in poverty, and many impoverished communities face rising deaths of despair on account of drug overdoses, alcoholism, and suicide.
Given the loss of social mobility and social status that comes with economic hardship, many political scientists argue that white, working-class Americans without college degrees are particularly receptive to right-wing populist messaging. Millennials who came of age during the Great Recession and who tend to hold more inclusionary values tend to be attracted to left-wing populism.
Cultural Abandonment
The cultural values camp explains that the rise of right-wing populism is a backlash against long-term, ongoing social change3. As America extended racial civil rights, became more egalitarian about gender roles, more open to LGBTQ rights, less religious, and more cosmopolitan traditionalist felt threatened and left behind. For cultural backlash theorists, the desire to reverse progressive reforms by electing a figure like Trump was a predictable reaction to liberal overreach. In hindsight, it now seems evident that progressive activists pushed through a social agenda faster than Main Street America could absorb it.
A necessary corollary held by advocates of the cultural backlash theory is that in the twenty-first century, much of the traditional socio-economic politics of the left and right have been replaced by socio-cultural ones. British Prime minister Tony Blair said as much when he said in a 2007 speech on globalization, “Modern politics has less to do with traditional positions of right versus left, more to do today, with what I would call the modern choice, which is open versus closed.” Under this view, the new left represents the progressive individualistic worldview, which values autonomy, mobility, and novelty. The cosmopolitan class described by this theory sees themselves “citizens of the world” and are comfortable with immigration and the spread of human rights legislation, which tends to dilute claims of national citizenship. Young activists of the new left are more concerned with identity politics and environmentalism than traditional class politics.
The new right or conservative wing of the political spectrum then represents traditionalists who are socially conservative, religious, and uncomfortable with immigration, expanded gender roles, and concerned with the loss of status of white, non-college graduates. Researchers describe traditionalists as being rooted in particular places and having ‘ascribed’ identities based on group belonging. Traditionalists are often associated with older, whiter, more rural, and less educated populations. According to a leading advocate of the cultural value perspective, Dr. Pippa Norris, “Because they feel under threat from the outside, they are hostile to outsiders—often those with different religious or ethnic backgrounds.” 3
The criticism of the new left is that while it occupies itself with identity politics, it not only fails to address working-class issues but also actively alienates much of mainstream America. By abandoning the working class as their primary area of concern, liberals provide an opening for right-wing populists to give voice to their anxieties. Trump’s populism that pits the “forgotten people”—to use his own phrase—against the elite, multicultural globalists of the left finds a receptive audience from those who feel marginalized and suffering from feelings of loss.
Cultural resentment fits less well in explaining the rise of Senator Sanders, who combines populist, anti-elite rhetoric with socially liberal values. Undoubtedly, while Sanders declares that the enemy of the people are not immigrants, but Wall Street and the billionaire class, he attracts some who find him a welcome antidote to President Trump’s nativism.
Populism—the Good and the Bad
A theme that comes out of the academic literature is that despite the popular association of populism with demagoguery, it can have benefits. For one, it succeeds in bringing up issues ignored by the political elites. Such matters may include immigration on the right and reversing neoliberal policies (especially privatization and austerity) on the left. Also, to take a page out of American history, defenders of progressive populism cite how the 1890 populist movement—which gave birth to the People’s Party—evolved into a movement that reformed political and economic institutions making them stronger and more inclusive.
Dangers of populism include:
- The denial that there are divisions within “the people” being defended, which excludes everyone who does not fit.
- An uncompromising stance leading to a polarized culture.
- A call for a purer majoritarian democracy which would endanger minority rights.
- Distrusting institutions, authoritarianism becomes a danger as power is centralized in a political authority.
- Appeals to emotions replacing rational discourse.4
How will Populist Appeals Play Out in the U.S. 2020 Elections?
While I am a very poor prognosticator (I did not believe for a moment that Trump had a chance of victory in the 2016 elections), I think that an understanding of this new populist age may shed some light on election trends. I contend that both cultural and economic factors play into the anger being expressed at the ballot box and contribute to the great mistrust that Americans report feeling towards their institutions. The conditions necessary for populist movements are running high.
Trump has broad support across the working and middle classes. He ingratiated himself with his base when he carried out many of his campaign promises, such as enacting harsh immigration policies, following through with his promised ‘Muslim ban,’ and successfully renegotiating NAFTA. He is even in the process of building a wall along the Mexican border, which he made the centerpiece of his 2016 campaign. While his supporters often decry his tweets and display of vulgarity, history shows that ‘bad manners’ by populists are often expected and rewarded.
Bernie Sander’s populism explains how he became one of two frontrunners in the Democratic primaries. However, polling shows that his base remains primarily with the youth. The support he once had with conservative rural whites evaporated when he loosened his talk of immigration restrictions as he pivoted to appeal to Hispanics and toughened his stance on gun control. While left populism catapulted Sanders upon the national stage, it seems unlikely he will triumph over Biden, who has a broad base and a lot of goodwill among Democrats on account of his close ties to Obama.
The political landscape of America certainly favors right-wing populism over its counterpart. While there is a strong infrastructure to promote right-wing populist themes from the far-right media that encompasses tv, radio, and internet sites and blogs, there is nothing comparable in size and reach on the left. A comparison of two populist movements, one left and one right, exemplify the political success of the far-right and the failure of left-populist movements. First, take the Occupy Wall Street movement, which was a genuinely left-populist movement that arose after the 2008 Financial Crisis. It remained largely apolitical and unorganized on account of its philosophic opposition to hierarchies and authority. It left no lasting legacy in the political arena. On the right-populist side, the Tea Party movement that grew in the 2000s is a master calls in strategic success. The Tea Party succeeded in essentially overthrowing the Republican establishment by ousting many of the party’s moderates. They even pressured the House Speaker at the time, John Boehner, to reassign for being too willing to compromise with the Democrats. Until progressive populists adopt the successful strategies of their counterparts on the right, their movements will continue to fail.
If I am right, and we are living in an age of populism, the right-wing populist Trump would have an advantage over a moderate candidate like Biden. The only overarching narrative that Biden promotes is that a vote for him would be a vote for a return to normalcy and the status quo. As Trump’s very ascendency to the Oval Office proves, many Americans have unresolved grievances and demand action.
Notes:
- SeePastor and Veronesi’s paper ‘Inequality Aversion, Populism, and the Backlash Against Globalization’, Benjamin’s Moffitt’s book The Global Rise of Populism, and Hans-George Betz’ ‘The Radical Right and Populism’.
- A leading advocate of this position is Chantel Mouffe (see her book For a Left Populism).
- Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart’s book Cultural Backlash: Trump, Brexit and Authoritarian Populism is an excellent example of this genre.
- See Cass Mudde’s ‘The Populist Zeitgeist’ and Bart Bonikowski’s influential “Ethno‐nationalist populism and the mobilization of collective resentment.”
